Systemic Conflict Convergence

Central knowledge for conflict‑free justice

SCC is a public‑interest academy and legal archive. Our mission is to help courts, lawyers, and the public recognize and resolve institutional conflicts that threaten the rights of indigent defendants. We document doctrine, define terms, and publish practical guidance to preserve fairness at every critical stage.

This site will serve as a single, reliable place to learn: what “conflict‑free counsel” requires, how imputation works across institutions, and why neutrality of prosecution and tribunal matters to due process. We aim to turn scattered filings into accessible doctrine and a durable public record.

Colorado Supreme Court

2025SA300 Questions Presented:

1. Public Defender Conflict.
Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated when the Colorado State Public Defender’s Office continues to represent a defendant while its statewide leadership is simultaneously defending the Office against that same defendant’s conflict‑of‑ interest claims, creating an imputed, irreconcilable conflict under Colo. RPC 1.7 and 1.10.

2. Prosecutorial Conflict.
Whether due process is violated when the District Attorney’s Office, having declined to investigate or prosecute a demonstrably false police report another District Attorney’s Office used to secure an arrest warrant and over a year of pretrial custody, turns around to charge the defendant with misdemeanor obstruction of governmental operations based on petitioner’s alleged communications demanding accountability for that same unaddressed misconduct, thereby wielding the criminal process to punish a legitimate challenge to the prosecution’s own unresolved conflict of Melissa Shopneck maliciously prosecuting now‑dismissed charges while under conflict with a sitting judge her office regularly does business in front of.

3. Judicial Conflict.
Whether due process is violated when the presiding judge conducts ex parte communications with the District Attorney’s Office and prospective defense counsel about the defendant’s mental competency before any counsel is formally appointed and without an on‑the‑record conflict inquiry, even as parallel proceedings in Denver District Court challenge unrecorded, weaponized competency conflicts, thereby signaling prejudgment and denying the defendant an impartial tribunal.

4. Systemic Conflict Convergence.
Whether the convergence of these structural conflicts, conflicted defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment, conflicted prosecution under due process, and a conflicted tribunal under Caperton, so eviscerates the adversarial process and denies the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights that it creates a systemic breakdown of the criminal justice system, presenting a question of first impression requiring this Court’s original supervisory intervention.

5. Indigent Defendant Equal Protection and Due Process.
Whether indigent defendants are denied equal protection and due process when structural conflicts infect the only counsel available, the Colorado State Public Defender’s Office, while non‑indigent defendants can secure private, conflict‑free representation “commensurate with that available to non‑indigent defendants,” in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

6. Veteran Leniency & ADA Accommodations.
Whether due process and equal protection are violated when courts and prosecutors disregard a combat veteran’s military service, trauma, and VA‑documented disabilities, and instead deny diversion or accommodations required by federal law, contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition that our Nation has a long tradition of affording leniency to veterans (Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43–44 (2009) (per curiam)) and the mandates of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a).

7. Breach of Federal NPA and State Plea Agreement.
Whether due process is violated when a federal non‑prosecution agreement conditioned on a state plea collapses because the State breaches the plea within days of execution and provides no remedy for years, leaving the defendant without the benefit of the bargain, in contravention of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971), which held that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, such promise must be fulfilled, and in violation of the constitutional guarantee of fundamental fairness in plea bargaining.

8. Impossibility and Illusory Plea.
Whether due process is violated when the State induces a guilty plea by promising diversionary programs or treatment courts that do not exist, rendering the plea involuntary and illusory under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s plea‑bargaining jurisprudence, including Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507–11 (1984), holding that a guilty plea must be voluntary, knowing, and not induced by unfulfilled promises, and Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971), recognizing that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, such promise must be fulfilled.

9. Conflict‑Free Counsel and Abandonment.
Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated when indigent defendants are compelled to proceed with counsel who withdraws for private gain, conceals conflicts of interest, or refuses to present the defendant’s chosen defense, thereby depriving the accused of conflict‑free representation and constituting structural error under Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481–91 (1978), holding that forcing joint representation over timely objection requires automatic reversal because prejudice is presumed; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–96 (1984), establishing that ineffective assistance requires deficient performance and resulting prejudice undermining confidence in the outcome; and People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 693–96 (Colo. 2010), recognizing that forcing a defendant to choose between counsel and the presentation of his chosen defense violates the right to counsel and fundamental trial rights.

10. Judicial Bias and Competency Weaponization.
Whether due process is violated when the presiding judge, before appointing counsel, engages in ex parte communications with the very public defender’s office the defendant has identified as conflicted, and in those communications suggests a competency evaluation, thereby prejudicing prospective counsel and weaponizing competency proceedings to delay, silence, and suppress defense, in violation of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876–87 (2009), holding that due process requires recusal where, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable; and Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378–86 (1966), holding that the conviction of a legally incompetent defendant violates due process and that courts must sua sponte conduct a competency hearing when evidence raises a bona fide doubt.

11. Brady Violations and Weaponized False Reports.
Whether due process is violated when the prosecution suppresses exculpatory evidence and relies on demonstrably false police reports and dismissed allegations to justify arrest, bond revocation, and competency proceedings, contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–88 (1963), holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment; and Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. ___, ___, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1335–36 (2022), holding that a criminal case terminates favorably for the accused when it ends without a conviction, underscoring the constitutional bar against weaponizing baseless charges once dismissed.

12. First Amendment Retaliation and Chilling Effect.
Whether the First Amendment permits criminalizing a citizen’s speech, even harsh or extreme speech, including alleged “true threats,” when that speech criticizes judicial and prosecutorial misconduct and arises as the only available means of resisting a Systemic Conflict Convergence; and whether charges and competency proceedings imposed in retaliation for such speech violate the recklessness standard required by Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2023), holding that the First Amendment requires proof that the speaker had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of the statement, with recklessness as the minimum standard, and the constitutional guarantees of free expression under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

13. Cumulative Structural Breakdown.
Whether the convergence of a breached federal non‑prosecution agreement, a breached state plea, conflicted defense counsel, conflicted prosecution, and a conflicted tribunal constitutes a systemic breakdown of the adversarial process, creating structural error that is not susceptible to harmless‑error review and requiring this Court’s supervisory intervention to preserve the integrity of criminal justice, in light of Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991), distinguishing between trial errors subject to harmless‑error review and structural defects affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds; United States v. Gonzalez‑Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148–50 (2006), holding that denial of the right to counsel of choice is structural error not subject to harmless‑error analysis; and Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 294–95 (2017), reaffirming that certain errors are structural because they undermine the fairness of the entire proceeding.

14. Speedy Trial Violation.
Whether petitioner’s statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated when the prosecution and court failed to bring him to trial within the 90‑day deadline mandated by C.R.S. § 18‑1‑405 and the Sixth Amendment, and when conflicted counsel failed to preserve the violation, compounding the deprivation of liberty and foreclosing meaningful review, in contravention of People v. Taylor, 2020 COA 79, ¶¶ 25–34, holding that dismissal is required when the government fails to meet statutory speedy trial deadlines; People v. DeGreat, 2020 CO 25, ¶¶ 1–4, 461 P.3d 11, 13–14 (Colo. 2020), holding that the duty to comply with Colorado’s speedy trial statute rests with the prosecution and the court, not the defendant; and Huang v. County Court, 98 P.3d 924, 927 (Colo. App. 2004), holding that “the speedy trial period is calculated separately for each criminal complaint” and that dismissed charges are a nullity, with a new speedy trial period beginning upon refiling, even if the charges are identical, citing People v. Allen, 885 P.2d 207 (Colo. 1994), and Meehan v. County Court, 762 P.2d 725 (Colo. App. 1988).

15. Denial of Access to Courts.
Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments are violated when an indigent, pro se defendant is denied the basic tools of defense, subpoenas, investigative assistance, phone calls, and uncensored legal mail, so that he cannot prepare or present his case, thereby extinguishing the constitutional right of access to the courts, in contravention of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821–25 (1977), holding that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires states to provide prisoners with adequate law libraries or legal assistance; and Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351–53 (1996), clarifying that denial of access to legal resources or assistance violates the Constitution when it frustrates a prisoner’s ability to bring a non‑frivolous legal claim.

16. Cruel and Unusual Pretrial Detention.
Whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are violated when a disabled combat veteran is subjected to prolonged pretrial detention under retaliatory and restrictive conditions, including isolation, denial of accommodations, and weaponized competency proceedings, thereby imposing impermissible punishment before conviction, contrary to Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–39 (1979), holding that under the Due Process Clause, a pretrial detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt, and that conditions or restrictions that are not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective constitute impermissible punishment; and Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015), holding that pretrial detainees’ constitutional protections under the Fourteenth Amendment are violated when officials impose conditions or use force that is objectively unreasonable, regardless of subjective intent.

17. Double Jeopardy, Collateral Estoppel, and Interdependent Plea Collapse.
Whether due process, double‑jeopardy, and collateral‑estoppel principles are violated when state prosecutors sequence a misdemeanor charge to extend time for a federal indictment, dismiss that charge once federal prosecution commences, then enter a federal non‑prosecution agreement conditioned on a state plea the State knows it cannot perform, and, after breaching that plea and concealing the breach for years, revive restraints and consequences despite the federal resolution, thereby weaponizing dual sovereignty and plea interdependence to circumvent constitutional protections, in contravention of Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443–46 (1970), holding that collateral estoppel is embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause and bars relitigation of an issue necessarily decided in the defendant’s favor; Bravo‑Fernandez v. United States, 580 U.S. 5, 12–14 (2016), reaffirming that acquittals have preclusive effect even when accompanied by inconsistent verdicts; and Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971), holding that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise of the prosecutor, such promise must be fulfilled.

18. Forced Medication / Inadequate Mental Health Care.
Whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, together with Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, are violated when state custodial staff administer harmful and contraindicated medications, simultaneously withhold effective, court‑authorized treatment, and layer multiple inappropriate drugs at once, while erasing documented disability accommodations, creating an escalating cycle of retaliation and neglect in response to grievances and abuse complaints; and whether such practices, carried out amid acknowledged facility staffing crises and withdrawn but coercive involuntary‑medication petitions, impose unconstitutional punishment and deny minimally adequate care and liberty, contrary to Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976), holding that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834–37 (1994), clarifying that officials act with deliberate indifference when they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990), holding that the Due Process Clause limits the State’s ability to administer antipsychotic drugs against a prisoner’s will, requiring procedural protections and medical justification.

19. HIPAA / Privacy Breaches.
Whether constitutional privacy, due process, and equal protection are violated when a defendant is court‑ordered into treatment and protected medical and federal case information is unlawfully disclosed in violation of HIPAA; when that breach is then used to accelerate a federal non‑prosecution agreement and state plea; and when, after the State breaches the plea and conceals the breach for years, the original HIPAA violation is weaponized against the defendant as evidence of “conspiracy theories,” thereby silencing him while Systemic Conflict Convergence suppresses a powder keg of public trust, contrary to Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977), recognizing a constitutional interest in avoiding disclosure of personal medical information; and NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138–39 (2011), assuming the existence of a constitutional right to informational privacy but relying on statutory safeguards such as HIPAA to protect it.

20. Custody‑Enabled Exploitation / Property Loss.
Whether the Constitution is violated when, during pretrial custody, a defendant’s vehicle and financial assets are seized, transferred, and sold without notice or hearing, contrary to Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–82 (1972), requiring notice and opportunity to be heard before deprivation of property; and United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53–55 (1993), holding that absent exigent circumstances, due process requires notice and hearing before property seizure, losses that would have been avoided had conflict‑free counsel safeguarded his rights, but instead went unchallenged because the Public Defender’s Office, entangled in Systemic Conflict Convergence, prioritized institutional self‑protection over the client, thereby violating the Sixth Amendment right to conflict‑free representation recognized in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348–50 (1980), and reducing not only property rights but the full spectrum of constitutional guarantees, present and future, to collateral casualties of custody.

21. Forfeiture of Counsel Without Valid Waiver.
Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments are violated when a trial court effectuates a forfeiture of the right to counsel by compelling a defendant to proceed pro se without conducting a full, on‑the‑record Arguello/Faretta inquiry into the defendant’s understanding, capacity, and voluntariness; and whether such a forfeiture is constitutionally invalid where contemporaneous Systemic Conflict Convergence exists, thereby rendering any purported waiver neither knowing, voluntary, nor intelligent, contrary to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975), requiring a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel; Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88–89 (2004), requiring trial courts to ensure defendants understand the dangers of self‑representation; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938), holding that waiver must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right; and People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87, 93–94 (Colo. 1989), requiring a full inquiry into capacity and voluntariness; and whether such a forfeiture constitutes structural error not subject to harmless‑error review under United States v. Gonzalez‑Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).

22. Denial of Records and Evidence as Institutional Suppression.
Whether due process and the right of access to the courts are violated when the court and prosecution fail or refuse to provide transcripts, discovery, and seized defense evidence (including unsearched or unreturned digital evidence), thereby preventing meaningful preparation, investigation, and presentation of the defense; and whether such omissions, far from neutral error, operate as deliberate acts of institutional self‑protection designed to shield and perpetuate Systemic Conflict Convergence, contrary to Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956), holding that denial of transcripts to indigent defendants violates due process and equal protection; Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227–28 (1971), requiring transcripts when necessary for an effective defense; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), holding that suppression of favorable evidence violates due process; and Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), recognizing the fundamental right of access to courts.

23. Judicial Vindictiveness in Response to Assertions of Systemic Conflict Convergence.
Whether due process is violated when judicial actions, such as initiating or encouraging competency evaluations, restricting communication, or imposing adverse case‑management rulings, are taken in direct response to a defendant’s protected advocacy and explicit assertions of Systemic Conflict Convergence, thereby creating the appearance of retaliatory motive, institutional self‑protection, and compromising the constitutional guarantee of an impartial tribunal, contrary to In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), holding that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process; Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009), holding that due process is violated where the probability of bias is constitutionally intolerable; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927), holding that judicial interest in the outcome violates due process; and North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), holding that judicial vindictiveness in response to the exercise of rights violates due process.

24. Denial of Liberal Construction and Judicial Accountability.
Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments are violated when the Colorado Supreme Court, in 2025SA130, refuses to apply the settled rule that pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, thereby extinguishing petitioner’s constitutional claims on technical grounds and confirming that even the guardians of justice have chosen silence over accountability, contrary to Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), holding that pro se pleadings are to be held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers; Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), summarily reversing for failure to liberally construe a pro se complaint; and Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), reaffirming that liberal construction is required to ensure access to courts and protection of constitutional rights, as well as the broader principle of access to courts recognized in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).